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The Chemical Weapons Convention: Hollow
Idealism or Capable Mechanism? The Syrian
Intervention as a Test Case
BY DAVID MARTIN *
INTRODUCTION
Once alarmed by the prospect of a unilateral American military
strike to destroy Syria’s chemical weapons and chemical weapons facilities, the international community has been pleasantly surprised at the
peaceful progress of the identification, location, and destruction of Syrian chemical weapons, enabled by the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC) framework. 1 Considering the unique circumstances that culminated in the disarmament agreement struck between the international
community and Syria, is the CWC framework responsible for the positive results thus far? Or is Syria’s accession to the CWC and subsequent
consent to the inspection and destruction of its chemical weapons arsenal a fortunate anomaly? This article concludes that: (1) the bold, flexible framework of the CWC made it possible for peaceful disarmament
in Syria; (2) the enforcement of the CWC in Syria serves to strengthen
its stature as a capable mechanism for future enforcement of chemical
weapons disarmament; and (3) the CWC framework can be a useful
model for future and existing disarmament agreements.
Section I of this article analyzes the background of chemical
weapons use and regulation, highlighting why universal disarmament is
vital to regional and universal stability. Section II discusses the legal
framework of the CWC, pointing out the unique features that make it an
* J.D., Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; Associate Attorney, Winstead PC. My heartfelt thank
you to Jennifer Reiz for helping me develop the idea for this article.
1. Ajey Lele & Gunjan Singh, Syria’s Chemical Weapons Mess and Great Power Game,
SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF PEACE AND CONFLICT (Sept. 26, 2013),
www.sspconline.org/opinion/SyriasChemicalWeaponMess_GreatPowerGame_26092013. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-219,
1974 U.N.T.S. 317 [hereinafter CWC].
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effective mechanism for chemical disarmament as compared to existing
disarmament frameworks (particularly the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty and the Biological Weapons Convention). Section III discusses
the events leading up to the decision to enforce the CWC in response to
Syria’s chemical weapons violations in 2013. Section IV analyzes the
aspects of the CWC framework that have made implementation in Syria
a success and those that could pose future challenges. Section V concludes that the CWC framework, which enabled the peaceful cooperation in the disarming of Syria, should not only serve as a model for resolving chemical weapons violations, but also for international
disarmament agreements in general.
I. BACKGROUND: HISTORY OF MODERN CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE AND
REGULATION
1. World War I
Chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons share the same capacity
to inflict mass casualties in one single attack. 2 World War I ushered in
the modern large-scale use of chemical weapons (CW). 3 Both sides of
that conflict used poisonous gasses to inflict excruciating suffering on
one another and to significantly increase battlefield casualties. 4 These
weapons essentially consisted of widely known commercial chemicals
placed into standard munitions such as grenades, artillery shells, and
other explosives. 5 Armed forces in World War I used at least twentyeight types of gases and sixteen different mixtures of gases during combat. 6 Such chemicals included chlorine (a respiratory irritant), phosgene
(a choking agent), and mustard gas (which causes agonizing burns on
the skin). 7 The results of CW use in World War I were gruesome and
costly, 8 causing nearly 100,000 deaths9 and injuring approximately one
million people. 10 In addition to the physical cost of human life, CW use
2. Ramesh Thakur, Introduction: Chemical Weapons and the Challenge of Weapons of
Mass Destruction, in THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: IMPLEMENTATION, CHALLENGES,
AND OPPORTUNITIES 1, 1 (Ramesh Thakur & Ere Haru eds., 2006).
3. BROOKS E. KLEBER & DALE BIRDSELL, THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE:
CHEMICALS IN COMBAT 3, 3 (Stetson Conn ed., Ctr. of Military History, 2003).
4. Chemical Weapons, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS (UNODA),
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Chemical/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2013).
5. Id.
6. KLEBER & BIRDSELL, supra note 3, at 3.
7. Chemical Weapons, supra note 4.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Thakur, supra note 2, at 6.
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inflicted a significant psychological toll on civilians: “[t]here can be no
doubt that gas warfare emerged from World War I with the reputation
of a horror weapon even when field experience did not substantiate this
view.” 11 Since World World I, chemical weapons have killed over one
million people throughout the world. 12 These statistics alone show the
horrifying destructive capability of CW, and thus the need to rid the
world of their existence.
2. Geneva Protocol (1925)
The Geneva Protocol, signed in 1925, was a response to the public
outrage resulting from CW use in World War I. 13 While a positive step,
the Geneva Protocol was limited. 14 The Protocol merely prohibited the
use of chemical weapons against those states who were party to the treaty; the protocol, however, “did not prohibit the development, production
or stockpiling of chemical weapons.” 15 Furthermore, many parties to the
Protocol reserved the right to use prohibited weapons against states that
were not party to the Agreement, and in response to any state that used
CW against it. 16
3. Post-Geneva
While some states have used chemical weapons since the Geneva
Protocol, CW use has not been pervasive. 17 Italy, however, used chemical weapons in small amounts against Ethiopia in the 1930s. 18 Germany
used poison gases in concentration camps in World War II, and Japan
used gas against China in World War II as well. 19 Since World War II,
states have used chemical weapons in only a few cases: by Egypt in
North Yemen in the 1960s, 20 and more notably by Iraq against Iran and
its own Kurdish population in the 1980s. 21 Iraq’s CW use in the 1980s
demonstrated that the effects of CW use can devastate and destabilize

11. KLEBER & BIRDSELL, supra note 3, at 653. The psychological harms of CW use are further discussed later in the
article.
12. Chemical Weapons, supra note 4.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.; Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 94 L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter
Geneva Protocol].
16. Chemical Weapons, supra note 4.
17. See id.
18. THOMAS L. MCNAUGHER, BALLISTIC MISSILES AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS: THE
LEGACY OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR 7 (1990).
19. Id. at 7; Chemical Weapons, supra note 4.
20. MCNAUGHER, supra note 18, at 7.
21. Id. at 22-23.
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nations and populations on a regional and potentially universal scale. 22
a. Iraq’s chemical weapons use in the 1980s
Iraq used chemical weapons as part of its arsenal during an extended conflict with Iran between 1982 and 1988. 23 A 1991 U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency report estimated that Iran suffered thousands of
deaths and tens of thousands of injuries as a result of Iraq’s CW use,
which was spread out over multiple attacks. 24 More alarming, “deferred
symptoms from low-dose exposure [have] continued to plague both the
civilian and military populations in Iran, producing thousands of additional deaths.” 25 The Iraqi regime, led by Saddam Hussein, also directed
chemical attacks against its own Kurdish population in retaliation for
their alleged support of Iran in the ongoing conflict. 26 Iraq’s CW use
against the Kurds was responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands,
including a single attack that killed 5,000. 27 Commentators credit Iraq’s
CW use as a major reason that Iran ultimately decided to negotiate a
cease-fire that was favorable for Iraq, despite Iran’s superior military
forces. 28
b. Physical and psychological effects
Chemical weapons are effective because of their psychological as
well as physical effects. 29 The “special emotional and psychological effects” of chemical weapons on a state’s population could produce greater harm than the mere physical effects of traditional weapons. 30 Chemical weapons have been dubbed as weapons of “political terror rather
than military force.” 31 Using the Iraq-Iran conflict as an example,
“[Iraq’s] threats to use CW against enemy civilians . . . did, apparently,
produce a drop in morale.” 32 Iraq’s CW use inflicted psychological injury on a large segment of the population: “[t]here is little doubt that
chemical weapons . . . played a role in sharply lowering the morale of

22. Id. at 32.
23. See id. at 8, 17.
24. Robin Wright, Chemical Arms’ Effect Linger Long After War, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 19,
2002), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2002/nov/19/world/fg-chemwar19.
25. Margaret Sewell, Freedom from Fear: Prosecuting the Iraqi Regime for the use of
Chemical Weapons, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 365, 371 (2004).
26. Id. at 372.
27. Id. at 373.
28. MCNAUGHER, supra note 18, at 5, 8.
29. Id. at 22.
30. See id. at 22.
31. Thakur, supra note 2, at 2.
32. MCNAUGHER, supra note 18, at 22.
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Iranian citizens and soldiers.” 33 In addition to Iraq’s actual use of chemical weapons, the mere threat of CW use against Iran greatly increased
“the sense of panic that already gripped Tehran’s residents . . . [f]or a
city already in panic, the threat of CW seems to have exacerbated the
problem, perhaps substantially.” 34 CW use also had a special emotional
and psychological impact on its observers: journalists interviewing
Kurdish leaders found them to be “fatalistic” after observing the fallout
from a chemical weapons attack on unprepared rebels and civilians. 35
Iraq’s CW use in the 1980s put the world on alert: both to the continued
destructive effect of CW and also to how powerful a state could become
when in possession of CW.
c. Toward proliferation and grim possibilities
The Cold War brought upon “significant development, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons.” 36 In addition to the arms
competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, smaller
regional powers and rogue nations have also viewed chemical weapons
as a quick and easy way to gain power. 37 Some third-world countries,
such as Iraq, considered chemical weapons as “the poor man’s nuclear
bomb,” enabling a state to inflict significant physical and psychological
damage on another, thereby wielding a great deal of political leverage to
achieve its ends. 38 An estimated twenty-five states were developing
chemical weapons capabilities by the 1970s and 80s. 39
Notwithstanding the psychological toll of CW, the physical consequences remain harrowing: in addition to the ability to cause death,
chemical weapons can also cause blindness, blistering, burning, lung
damage, skin discoloration, involuntary urination and defecation, vomiting, twitching, convulsions, paralysis, and unconsciousness. 40 From a
military-strategic standpoint, however, chemical weapons are not “nearly magical devices” that ensure victory on the battlefield.41 Modern
chemical battlefield equipment such as masks and suits can adequately
counter chemical weapons’ physical effects, especially when soldiers

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 6.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Chemical Weapons, supra note 4.
Sewell, supra note 25, at 367.
MCNAUGHER, supra note 18, at 6.
Chemical Weapons, supra note 4.
Sewell, supra note 25, at 371-72.
MCNAUGHER, supra note 18, at 21.
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are well-trained. 42 Furthermore, difficulties in storing, transporting, and
dispersing chemical weapons, as well as the need for large quantities of
CW in order to be effective, somewhat limit their military utility. 43 Nevertheless, CW makes war more than just “uncomfortable,” even for
properly equipped and prepared soldiers. 44
Not surprisingly, and perhaps more ominously, “chemical weapons
are grimly effective when used against unprotected civilians.” 45 The
threat of a chemical attack on a major city with a dense population is a
primary concern. 46 Some of the special qualities of chemical weapons
make them particularly effective if dispersed in an urban setting. 47
Chemical agents “would seep into basements and bunkers that conventional bombs would [normally] leave untouched.” 48 Chemicals’ ability
to linger, especially if they entered closed rooms, “extend[] their lethality (depending on the agent) over hours, days, or perhaps weeks.” 49 Finally, instead of being dissipated by the winds of open terrain, the dispersion of chemical weapons in cities might be constrained by walls and
buildings, causing even more casualties. 50 While there have been few
chemical attacks on major cities, in 1995, an underground religious sect,
Aum Shinrikyo, unleashed a terrorist attack on a Tokyo subway using a
nerve gas called “sarin,” which resulted in ten deaths, thousands injured,
and millions terrorized. 51 Officials opined that “[h]ad their delivery capability not been so primitive, the death toll would have been substantially larger.” 52
Although chemical weapons do not have the same magnitude of
destructive capability as nuclear weapons, states fear CW proliferation
in part because of the potential for a “strategic marriage” of chemical
warheads atop ballistic missiles. Achieving such a potent combination
would place leaders of less developed, ill-intentioned countries in a position to create a “delicate balance of terror.” 53 In return, a state seeking
to block such a power grab might entertain preemption, creating even

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See id. at 19.
Thakur, supra note 2, at 2.
MCNAUGHER, supra note 18, at 21.
Id. at 22.
See id. at 30.
Id.
Id.
Id.
MCNAUGHER, supra note 18, at 30.
Thakur, supra note 2, at 6.
Id.
MCNAUGHER, supra note 18, at 24.
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more instability. 54 Israeli strategist Gerald Steinberg commented that
“[t]he introduction of missiles reduces critical decision making time to a
few minutes. In a crisis, states that face the possibility of a missile attack involving chemical . . . warheads will be strongly induced to launch
a preemptive strike.” 55 Indeed, states enduring the horror of a ballistic
missile chemical attack and regional alliances to which they belong
(such as NATO, the African Union, and the League of Arab States)
would have legal authority to retaliate proportionally according to the
UN Charter. 56 Article 52 of the UN Charter recognizes the right of regional security alliances to “maintain . . . international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such . . . activities
are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.” 57
Without the development of secure second-strike capabilities, the
proliferation of chemically-armed ballistic missiles brought to the world
the prospect of a new and dangerous source of instability, especially in
the Middle East, a region already well known for its volatility. 58 While
chemical warheads were not attached atop ballistic missiles during the
Iran-Iraq War (CW were deployed by more conventional means), the
potential for their combined use for more accurate and lethal strikes on
unprepared populations caused increased concern for proliferation,
prompting the creation of new institutions aimed at curbing key elements of these technologies. 59 By the late 1980s, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Syria,
and Egypt possessed the requisite missile technology and chemical
manufacturing facilities to combine CW and ballistic missile capabilities. 60 The groundwork was set for what would ultimately become the
most comprehensive treaty calling for the complete eradication of an
entire class of weapon: The Chemical Weapons Convention. 61

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Jordan J. Paust, Use of Military Force in Syria by Turkey, NATO, and the United States,
34 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 431, 435-36 (2012).
57. Id. (quoting U.N. Charter Art. 52).
58. MCNAUGHER, supra note 18, at 24.
59. Id. at 25.
60. Id.
61. Robert J. Mathews, The First Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention:
A Drafter’s Perspective, in THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: IMPLEMENTATION,
CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES 44, 44 (Ramesh Thakur & Ere Haru eds., 2006).
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II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: AN
AGREEMENT WITH BITE
1. Chemical Weapons Convention Overview
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) provides a strong
framework for the worldwide destruction of chemical weapons, with its
key feature being a powerful enforcement mechanism to bring about
compliance. 62 The UN Charter, signed at the end of WWII, planted the
seed for future arms regulation. 63 Article 11 of the UN Charter states
that the General Assembly may consider “principles governing disarmament and regulation of armaments” to further international cooperation, peace, and security. 64 After twelve years of negotiating, the CWC
was finally adopted by the Conference on Disarmament in September
1992, opened for signature in Paris in January 1993, and entered into
force on April 29, 1997. 65
The provisions in the CWC are bold. Indeed, the CWC is the first
multilateral disarmament agreement that calls for the “elimination of an
entire category of weapons of mass destruction under universally applied international control,” which includes the inspection, verification,
and destruction of chemical weapons. 66 The CWC is also notable for its
collaboration with the global chemicals industry and the industry’s ongoing cooperation with the Convention’s industrial verification regime. 67 “[T]he Convention encourages international cooperation among
countries in the peaceful uses of chemicals and provides assistance and
protection to signatories” that are under actual, or the threat of, chemical
attack. 68 One hundred and eighty-nine nations, now including Syria, are
parties to the CWC, which represents about 98% of the world’s population. 69 To date, only six states have yet to become a party to the CWC:
Israel, Myanmar, Angola, Egypt, North Korea, and South Sudan. 70 Of
those six countries, only Israel and Myanmar have signed the treaty. 71

62. Chemical Weapons, supra note 4.
63. See U.N. Charter art. 11, para. 1.
64. Id.;
Disarmament
in
the
General
Assembly,
UNODA,
http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/GA.shtml (last visited Sept. 4, 2014).
65. Chemical Weapons, supra note 4. CWC, supra note 1.
66. See id. (emphasis added).
67. Thakur, supra note 2.
68. Id.
69. Chemical Weapons, supra note 4.
70. About the OPCW, ORGANIZATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS
(OPCW), http://www.opcw.org/about-opcw/non-member-states/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2014).
71. Id.
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2. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW):
A Big Stick
The defining feature of the CWC framework is that it allows for
“stringent verification of compliance by States Parties.” 72 The CWC accomplished this by creating a commission, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague, the Netherlands,
specifically to oversee the CWC’s implementation. 73 Article VIII, paragraph 34 of the CWC calls for an Executive Council of the OPCW to
conclude agreements with states party to the CWC, collectively called
the Conference of the States Parties, on behalf of the OPCW. 74 The Executive Council consists of representatives of forty-one states parties,
who are elected for two-year terms, and meet four to five times per
year. 75 The Conference of States Parties includes all the CWC states and
meets annually. 76 A Technical Secretariat possesses the day-to-day administration and implementation responsibilities of the Convention, including inspections, and is under the leadership of a Director-General
who his appointed at the Executive Council’s recommendation. 77 The
UN and the OPCW formed a legally binding relationship that entered
into force in May 2001. 78
The OPCW’s purpose is to implement the provisions of the CWC
and to ensure a “credible, transparent regime to verify the destruction of
chemical weapons.” 79 Through its mandate to achieve the object and
purpose of the CWC, the OPCW has four goals:
(1) overseeing and verifying the destruction of all existing chemical weapons under international verification by the OPCW; (2) “monitoring [the] chemical industry to prevent new weapons from reemerging;” (3) “providing assistance and protection to States Parties
against chemical threats;” and (4) “fostering international cooperation to
strengthen implementation of the Convention and promot[ing] the
72. Chemical Weapons, supra note 4.
73. Id.
74. CWC art. 8, para. 34.
75. Thakur, supra note 2, at 8.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Decision of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, ORGANIZATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, Doc. C-VI/DEC.5 (May
17, 2001), available at http://www.opcw.org/index.php?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=4315;
Agreement Concerning the Relationship Between the UN and the OPCW, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/55/283
(Sept.
24,
2001),
available
at
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/55/283 [hereinafter U.N. Doc.
A/Res/55/283]
79. Chemical Weapons, supra note 4.
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peaceful use of chemistry,” 80 which includes deactivating, destroying, or
converting to peaceful purposes all chemical weapons production facilities. 81 This means that while the OPCW seeks the destruction of existing
chemical weapons stockpiles, it also works to both persuade the small
number of states yet to join the Convention to renounce CW and also to
prevent the proliferation of CW by non-party states. 82 The OPCW must
also keep an eye on those areas seeking to re-stock CW to prevent old
threats from re-emerging. 83
3. Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigating Alleged Chemical
Weapons Use
In 1987, prior to the CWC’s entry into force, the UN and Member
States granted the UN Secretary-General authority to investigate the alleged uses of chemical, biological, or toxin weapons through legal authority called The Secretary-General’s Mechanism (SGM), 84 which
passed as Security Council Resolution 620. 85 Under the SGM framework, UN member states may request that the Secretary-General investigate alleged CW use. 86 The Secretary-General is then authorized to
send fact-finding teams to the site (or sites) of the alleged incident and
report back to the UN.87 The object of such an investigation would be to
ascertain any violations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol’s ban on CW use
or other customary international law. 88 The key elements of the SGM
are the roster of experts and laboratories provided by UN member states
and the Guidelines and Procedures for the conduct of investigations endorsed by the General Assembly in 1990. 89
The SGM plays a role in the CWC framework, because the OPCW
is authorized by the CWC to conduct investigations in cases of alleged
chemical weapons use by States Parties. 90 However, as provided by the
80. About the OPCW, supra note 70; see Chemical Weapons, supra note 4.
81. Thakur, supra note 2, at 8.
82. See About the OPCW, supra note 70.
83. Id.
84. Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological
Weapons,
UNODA,
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/SecretaryGeneral_Mechanism/
[hereinafter
Secretary-General’s
Investigation.];
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Secretary-General_Mechanism/; Secretary General’s
Mechanism, G.A. Res. A/RES/42/37C. (Nov. 30, 1987).
85. S.C. Res. 620, U.N. Doc. S/RES/620 (Aug. 26, 1988), available at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/620%281988%29.).
86. Secretary-General’s Investigation, supra note 84.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.; U.N. Doc. A/44/561 Annex I (1990).
90. Secretary-General’s Investigation, supra note 84.
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CWC, in cases of alleged use of chemical weapons by non-parties, the
OPCW must closely cooperate with the Secretary-General, 91 and must
place its resources at the disposal of the Secretary-General if so requested. 92 In September 2012, the UN and the OPCW concluded an agreement that set forth the means and procedures of cooperation between the
two bodies for conducting an investigation in such circumstances. 93 Prior to the recent investigation of alleged CW use in Syria, the SGM was
used to investigate alleged CW use in Mozambique and Azerbaijan in
1992, 94 but found no evidence of use in those instances. 95
4. Potent Features of the CWC
The CWC has several hallmark features that enable it to be effective in eliminating the use, stockpiling, development, and proliferation
of chemical weapons. Among those are (1) a wide scope and comprehensive set of prohibitions; (2) permitting flexibility in the means by
which to accomplish those ends; (3) an effective challenge and verification protocol; (4) provisions that incentivize national implementation of
legislation to meet CWC goals; and (5) provisions for persistent efforts
to achieve universal adoption of the CWC.
a. A Comprehensive Set of Prohibitions
Overall, negotiators successfully agreed on a broad scope and a
comprehensive set of prohibitions in the CWC. 96 Importantly, they formulated a definition of “chemical weapons,” which was among the
more significant aspects of the Convention. 97 Article II of the CWC sets
forth the definition of CW, which covers toxic and precursor chemicals,
munitions, and devices specifically designed for chemical weapons purposes, as well as any equipment specifically designed for direct use in
the employment of such munitions and devices. 98
91. U.N. Doc. A/Res/55/283, supra note 78.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. FAQ about the U.N. Mission to investigate the Allegations of the Use of Chemical
Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, UNITED NATIONS INFORMATION SERVICE (Sept. 5, 2013),
http://www.unis.unvienna.org/pdf/2013/FAQs_about_the_UN_Mission_to_investigate_the_alleg
ed_use_of_chemical_weapons_in_Syria.pdf [hereinafter FAQ about UN Mission to Investigate].
95. Gregory D. Koblentz, Probing for Chemical Attacks in Syria, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/syria/probing-chemical-attacks-syria/p30318.
96. Ralf Trapp, The Chemical Weapons Convention – Multilateral Instrument With a Future, in THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: IMPLEMENTATION, CHALLENGES, AND
OPPORTUNITIES 15, 19 (Ramesh Thakur & Ere Haru eds., 2006).
97. Id.
98. Id.
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Crucially different from other international arms agreements, the
CWC classifies components of chemical weapons in themselves as prohibited chemical weapons. 99 Article II focuses on the specific chemical’s intended purpose rather than the degree of toxicity as a defining
criterion. 100 “Any toxic or precursor chemical is regarded as a chemical
weapon unless it has been developed, produced, stockpiled, or used for
purposes not prohibited, and only as long as types and quantities are
consistent with such purposes.” 101 This definition, along with the States
Parties’ undertakings in Article I to “never, under any circumstances”
develop, produce, otherwise acquire, retain or stockpile, transfer directly or indirectly to anyone, or use chemical weapons, provides “a longlasting safeguard” to ensure that the object and purpose of the CWC is
not defeated due to definitional loopholes. 102
b. The Verification and Challenge System
In addition to a comprehensive prohibition at the heart of the
CWC, the States Parties also agreed on effective mechanisms for compliance verification. The CWC requires States Parties to: (1) declare all
CW, CW production facilities, and related matters, and to submit them
to international inspection; (2) declare all “relevant chemical activities
and facilities undertaken
. . . for legitimate purposes” and to submit them to international inspection; and (3) “inform the OPCW of their national implementation
measures,” which are to include actions such as implementing “penal
legislation and enforcing trade regulations designed to stem the proliferation of relevant chemicals to states not party to the CWC.” 103 Granted,
the system relies, to a considerable degree, on the States Parties’ own
submissions to the OPCW and thus, “a bona fide presumption of honesty and intent to comply” exists. 104 Still, the CWC is “justifiably regarded
as setting the benchmark for verification in a multilateral arms control
treaty.” 105
However, the CWC, does provide mechanisms to verify facts independently and to address and resolve compliance doubts, including
those with respect to undeclared facilities. 106 Article IX and the Verifi99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 20.
Trapp, supra note 96, at 20.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Mathews, supra note 61, at 63.
Trapp, supra note 96, at 21.
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cation Annex (VA) outline a “challenge inspection” protocol 107 based on
the principles of “short notice, anytime, anywhere, [with] no right of refusal,” which was “quite a novelty” among both international and even
regional arms agreements. 108 The challenge inspection system has been
recognized as “the ultimate guardian of the effective implementation of,
and strict compliance with, the Convention.” 109 Paragraphs 8 through 25
of Article IX of the CWC outline the OPCW’s authority to conduct onsite inspections in a territory within “the jurisdiction or control of a
State Party” whenever a State Party’s non-compliance is brought to the
OPCW’s attention.” 110 This inspection authority is incredibly important
because of its deterrent effect. 111 In addition to exposing and remedying
non-compliance, a challenge inspection also serves a dual-purpose of
establishing that there had been no breach of the CWC in questionable
cases, which would enhance confidence among States Parties that states
had complied with their obligations. 112
A challenge request must specify the State Party to be inspected,
the inspection team’s point of entry, the size and type of the inspection
site, the concern regarding the possible non-compliance, and the name
of the observer of the requesting State Party. 113 The only way to block
the request is if a three-quarter majority of the Executive Council’s forty-one members is “against carrying out the challenge inspection . . .
[because it would] be frivolous, abusive, or clearly beyond the scope of
th[e] Convention.” 114 The requesting State Party would first request to
inspect a designated perimeter, and if the inspected state objects to the
proposed perimeter, the requesting state will designate an alternative perimeter, which will become the designated area and bar further negotiations. 115 The inspection team must notify the inspected State of the point
of entry at least twelve hours in advance of its arrival, and the inspected
State must grant entry to the inspection team within 108 hours after the
inspection team arrives at the point of entry. 116 The OPCW will take into
account any domestic challenges that the inspected State might be un107. Masahiko Asada, The Challenge Inspection System of the Chemical Weapons Convention: Problems and Prospects, in THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: IMPLEMENTATION,
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 75, 78 (Ramesh Thakur & Ere Haru eds., 2006).
108. Trapp, supra note 96, at 22.
109. Asada, supra note 107, at 76.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 77.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 78.
114. Asada, supra note 107, at 79.
115. Id. at 80.
116. Id.
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der. 117
c. National Implementation
The CWC requires States Parties to enact and implement national
laws that ensure the international ban on chemical weapons is reflected
in national laws. The CWC also requires that any violator can be “apprehended, prosecuted and punished no matter where an offence is
committed.” 118 International law traditionally expects countries to take
domestic implementation measures to ensure that their citizens follow
the rules of any agreement struck between states, which are typically a
matter of state sovereignty and constitutional framework. 119 The CWC
is “somewhat more specific,” requiring States Parties to: 1) “adopt [the]
necessary measures to implement the Convention;” 2) adopt the necessary measures to ensure that potentially harmful chemicals within state
borders are used only for permitted purposes; and 3) “cooperate with
other States Parties and afford legal assistance . . . in the context of . . .
sharing information for prosecution purposes.” 120 Furthermore, since the
wake of the 9/11 attacks, states are now required to adopt and enforce
legislation prohibiting “any non-state actor to manufacture, acquire,
possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery.” 121
The CWC requires each State Party “to designate or establish a
National Authority to ensure the effective implementation of the
CWC.” 122 The National Authority makes initial and annual declarations
on chemical weapons stockpiles and facilities, “coordinates and participates in the receipt of OPCW inspections of industrial and military
sites,” participates in assisting states under chemical attack or threat of
chemical attack, and “promotes the peaceful use of chemicals.” 123 “The
National Authority is thus the focal point in a country’s interaction with
other countries and the OPCW.” 124 While OPCW inspections could always raise domestic sovereignty and constitutional issues, the CWC’s

117. See id. at 88.
118. Trapp, supra note 96, at 31; CWC supra note 1.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 31-32.
121. FAIZA PATEL KING, Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention: A Comparative
Case Study of the Legislation of Australia and France, in THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS
CONVENTION: IMPLEMENTATION, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES 101, 101 (Ramesh Thakur
& Ere Haru eds., 2006).
122. Thakur, supra note 2, at 9.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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intensive efforts of encouraging and enabling States Parties to set up
their own national implementation scheme is invaluable.
d. Flexibility
Another defining feature of the CWC is that its provisions allow
for flexibility in achieving its ends. The mandate given to the OPCW
through Article VIII itself is very broad: “to achieve the object and purpose of the Convention, to ensure the implementation of its provisions,
including those for international verification of compliance with it, and
to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties.” 125
Article VIII also calls upon the OPCW to conduct inspections in
the least intrusive manner possible by requiring it to protect confidentiality and to use scientific advances to increase the effectiveness of verification. 126 The OPCW was thus conceived as a “learning organization
that would adapt to new developments in science and technology.” 127
Through the call of Article VIII to “provide a forum for consultation . . . among States Parties,” 128 the OPCW’s mandate is by no means
limited to the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles. In addition to
destruction, the mandate also allows States Parties to address new security challenges related to chemical weapons, adjust the implementation
process to new requirements, and adapt the regime as necessary. 129 In a
sense, the CWC sets up a formal dialogue between the States Parties
and the OPCW, both of which work to modify a living document that is
the CWC. The Conference of the States Parties is encouraged to “make
recommendations and take decisions on any questions, matters or issues
related to [the] Convention.” 130
The CWC also provides flexibility by allowing a state to take protective security measures in the event that it comes under threat of, or
actual, chemical attack. 131 Article X of the CWC “provide[s] for a variety of mechanisms to deal with possible future CW threats”, and “calls
for enhanced cooperation between the parties in exchanging equipment
for protective purposes.” 132 According to Ralf Trapp, the Convention
was clearly drafted as a “flexible and adaptable legal instrument” capa125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Trapp, supra note 96, at 22 (internal citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Trapp, supra, note 96 at 23.
Id.; CWC, art. X.
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ble of withstanding time constraints, scientific and technological advances, economic changes, and security in general. 133
The Convention is unique in that there are two different processes
to amend or change its provisions. 134 In addition to a typical amendment
procedure, which risks “unraveling previously existing consensus,” the
Convention also provides for a “simplified procedure called a
‘change’,” to be used when the proposed adjustment is already widely
agreed upon. 135 This innovative process made it possible to “adjust
technical and administrative procedures that might in [the] future turn
out to be impractical, insufficient, technically obsolete, or otherwise in
need of adaptation.” 136 Some early proposals for changes have demonstrated that the OPCW is “indeed capable of going through technical/
administrative change” and that the apparatus “can be utilized to adjust
the technicalities of CWC implementation to new [ ] conditions in the
real world.” 137
Lastly, the CWC shows flexibility in the means by which it incentivizes non-parties to join the Convention. Rather than a “one size fits
all” means of accession to the Convention, the CWC language encourages “bilateral, regional, and appropriate measures” on the part of the
OPCW Technical Secretariat to facilitate non-parties to join and comply
with the Convention. 138 This flexibility is key because “if there were a
growing perception that the CWC, and hence the OPCW, were no longer suited to dealing with the changing threats posed by chemical weapons today and in the future, the ramifications would strike at the heart of
the Convention itself, and “go far beyond the chemical weapons arena.” 139 By allowing states to address their concerns in a bilateral or regional context, they can feel more secure and confident that their needs
will be met when joining the CWC, increasing the likelihood that those
states will join the Convention.
e. Universality
The CWC unabashedly calls for the destruction of chemical weapons, which can only become possible if the Convention becomes universal. 140 While the word “universality” does not explicitly appear in the
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Trapp, supra note 96, at 23.
See id.
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id. at 27 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Trapp, supra note 96, at 38.
Id. at 31.
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text, the CWC’s Preamble nevertheless refers to “progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international
control,” total exclusion of the possibility of CW use, and “the complete
and effective prohibition of . . . chemical weapons.’” 141 These goals implicitly call for a universal adherence by all states and jurisdictions,
since they cannot be accomplished without it. 142 Initial sessions of the
Conference of the States Parties referred to a plan of action “inspired by
the objective of achieving universal adherence to the Convention ten
years after its entry into force.” 143 While progress towards universality
has been largely “rapid and steady,” the remaining states not party to the
Convention will likely take more time and provide plenty of challenges. 144
Under the Universality Action Plan, a Director of External Relations from the Technical Secretariat’s office was selected to invite
States Parties to designate points of contact in regions and sub-regions
in which universality needs special promotion. 145 These points of contact communicate with non-party states to educate them on the economic and political benefits of joining the Convention. 146 The OPCW Technical Secretariat’s engagement with regional and sub-regional
organizations, as well as targeted bilateral assistance from itself and
States Parties has since furthered the push toward universality. 147 While
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) have many of the same parties in common with
the CWC, only sixty parties to the NPT have consented to broader rights
of inspection than previously authorized, and the BWC lacks any kind
of verification mechanism, unlike the CWC. 148 Therefore, the CWC’s
near-universality seems more meaningful. 149
The Conference of the States Parties affirmed all of the aforementioned aspects of the CWC in April 2013 at the Third Review Conference, including: (1) reviewing “relevant scientific and technological developments;” (2) acknowledging new parties to the Convention while
maintaining universality as a goal; (3) reaffirming all States Parties’ ef141. Keith Wilson, Standing the Test of Time – Efforts to Achieve Universality of the CWC, in
THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: IMPLEMENTATION, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES
150, 151 (Ramesh Thakur & Ere Haru eds., 2006); CWC Preamble.
142. Wilson, supra note 141, at 151.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 153.
145. Id. at 154.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 164, 168.
148. Wilson, supra note 141, at 158-59.
149. Id.
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forts to destroy CW within its control and affirming universal destruction of CW as the object and purpose of the treaty; and (4) asserting that
“full, effective, and non-discriminatory” implementation of the verification scheme is essential for realizing that purpose.” 150
But is the CWC really as capable and radical as some commentators suggest? Will its provisions realistically enable the world to be free
of chemical weapons? One critic remains cautious and questioned
whether the international community could sustain the political will to
enforce and achieve the objectives of the CWC, which would require
unceasing energy and constant adaptation to changing technology and
security environments. 151 Another pundit pointed out “serious challenges,” in the coming years, including: universality, maintaining competence of the technical secretariat, and obtaining full adherence by States
Parties to the CWC’s legislative requirements. 152 Others suggested that
the biggest challenge to the credibility of the CWC was that the challenge system had “neither [been] used nor requested.” 153 It seemed that
in order for the CWC to truly demonstrate its capability as a new and
more capable disarmament mechanism, it needed a real-world test. That
test came in Syria in 2013.
III. TESTING THE LIMITS OF THE CWC: SYRIA’S 2013 CHEMICAL
WEAPONS USE
Use of chemical weapons in Syria during its civil war in 2013 put
the CWC framework to the test that many had wondered whether it
could withstand. The CWC, OPCW, and the Secretary-General’s Mechanism all played a role in the 2013 allegation, verification, and destruction of chemical weapons in Syria. While many critics doubted whether
the international framework could effectively succeed in the midst of
political and practical pressures, the application of the CWC in Syria
demonstrated that it is a strong and able mechanism fit for the task of
the universal destruction of CW. The CWC’s credibility was not only
strengthened, but the drafters of existing and future arms treaties could
now look to the CWC as a model to emulate in order to maximize effectiveness.

150. Rep. of the Third Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the
Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, Third Review Conference, Apr. 8-19, 2013,
U.N. Doc. RC-3/3 (Apr. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Report of the Third Special Session].
151. See Trapp, supra note 96, at 35.
152. Mathews, supra note 61, at 63-64.
153. Asada, supra note 107, at 88.
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1. Allegation
While the media devoted much attention to the use of chemical
weapons during the Syrian Civil War in August 2013, 154 the Syrian government actually first reported the use of chemical weapons on March
19, 2013 in the Khan Al-Asal area of the Aleppo Governorate. 155 The
next day, Syria requested the Secretary-General to initiate an investigation under the authority of the SGM, rather than the CWC, since Syria
was not yet a party to the convention. 156 The Secretary-General assured
the international community that all credible allegations would be investigated and would dispatch a special team of experts comprised of individuals from the OPCW and World Health Organization to investigate
three of the reported incidents. 157
Shortly after the team’s arrival in Damascus on August 18, 2013, 158
reports emerged that chemical weapons were allegedly used in a major
attack in the Ghouta area of Damascus. 159 UN Member States requested
that the Secretary-General order an investigation “making use of the
Mission already in Syria,” to which the Secretary-General assented on
August 22. 160 That same day, the UN Security Council held an emergency meeting in which the Council’s President encouraged a “thorough, impartial, and prompt investigation” of whether chemical weapons were used. 161 The Secretary-General also ordered his High
Representative for Disarmament Affairs travel to Damascus to ensure
that the Syrian Government cooperated so that the incident in Ghouta
could be properly investigated. 162 Syria granted permission to the investigative team and the Mission commenced its on-site work the next
day. 163

154. See Joe Lauria, U.N. Chief Hints at Findings in Syria, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 14-15, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324576304579073362942072786.html; see also
Carl Bialik, Syria Clouded by Chaos of War, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 14-15, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324755104579071332905941934.html; Catherine E. Shoichet & Tom Watkins, Strike Against Syria? Obama backs it, but Wants Congress to
Vote, CNN (Aug. 31, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/31/world/meast/syria-civil-war/.
155. FAQ about the U.N. Mission to investigate the Allegations of the Use of Chemical
Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, supra note 94.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. FAQ about the U.N. Mission to investigate the Allegations of the Use of Chemical
Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, supra note 94.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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2. Verification and Violation
On September 16, 2013, the initial findings of the OPCW Mission
team determined that chemical weapons were used in the attack on
Ghouta. 164 The Mission found: (1) impacted and exploded surface-tosurface rockets still found to contain sarin; (2) environments around the
rocket impact sites contaminated with sarin; (3) a number of survivors
who clearly demonstrated symptoms of exposure to chemical compounds; and (4) virtually all blood samples taken from the survivors
were found positive for sarin. 165
In a note transmitting the findings of the Mission to the Security
Council and General Assembly, the Secretary-General expressed “profound shock and regret” that chemical weapons were indeed used in
Syria. 166 Moreover, the Secretary-General pointed out that the use was
on a large scale, resulting in numerous casualties, particularly among
civilians, which included many children. 167 He condemned “in the
strongest possible terms” the use of chemical weapons and asserted that
the CW use was a war crime, a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol,
and a violation of customary international law. 168
While the Mission was required to determine whether chemical
weapons were used, it was not required to determine who used them. 169
The Governments of Syria, Russia, and Iran claimed that opposition rebels were responsible for the attack. 170 While who is responsible remains an open question for the UN, the nature of the Missions findings
appear to suggest blame on the Syrian Government. 171
3. Consent and Accession
Opinions of how to respond to Syria’s chemical weapons use varied. The United States considered a unilateral military strike, 172 citing
Syria’s “flagrant actions” as being in violation of international norms,
164. Head of United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical
Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the
Ghouta area of Damascus on 21 August 2013, transmitted by Note of the Secretary-General, U.N.
Doc. A/67/997-S/2013/533 (Sept. 16, 2013), available at
http://www.un.org/disarmament/content/slideshow/Secretary_General_Report_of_CW_Investigat
ion.pdf [hereinafter Report on the Alleged Use].
165. Id. ¶ 29.
166. Id. ¶ 1.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Lauria, supra note 154.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Shoichet & Watkins, supra note 154.
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laws of war, and threats to the security of the Middle East and the United States respectively. 173 The U.S. pointed out that an overwhelming
majority of nations were parties to the CWC. 174 Syria, however, was not
a party to the CWC at the time of the August 2013 attack in the Ghouta
region. 175 As a result, the UN asserted that Syria’s use of chemical
weapons violated the 1925 Geneva Protocol (which banned the use of
chemical weapons), rather than the CWC, and that the SecretaryGeneral had authority under the SGM to investigate alleged CW use by
states not party to the CWC. 176
Critics asserted that Syria’s use of CW posed a serious challenge
for the international community and the OPCW. 177 While “[v]erified destruction of chemical weapons facilities by the OPCW would validate
its commitment to disarmament and global peace,” some doubted
whether the OPCW even had a legal mandate to intervene at all, since
Syria was not party to the CWC. 178 Furthermore, observers opined that
the role of the Syrian government would be crucial in facilitating
OPCW inspections, because it would have to ensure the inspectors’
safety while they carried out their investigation in the midst of a civil
war. 179 Complicating matters more was the difficulty of determining the
exact number of deaths in the midst of a chaotic war zone, inevitably influenced by the agendas of nations seeking to craft an appropriate response or lack of response. 180 Estimates of the death toll ranged from
281 to roughly 1,500 persons in Damascus. 181
The U.S. plan for force was widely opposed domestically and
abroad. 182 Britain’s Prime Minister supported a potential American intervention, but its Parliament rejected the plan. 183 President Obama mus-

173. Letter from President Obama to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate
(Aug. 31, 2013), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/SyriaLetter.pdf.
174. Id.
175. Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons, supra note 164.
176. Id. ¶¶ 1, 3.
177. Weapons in Mideast Serious Challenge for International Community, BUSINESSSTANDARD (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/use-ofchemical-weapons-in-mideast-serious-challenge-for-international-community113091200979_1.html.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Bialik, supra note 154.
181. Id.
182. America, Russia, and Syria: Style and Substance, ECONOMIST (Sept. 21, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21586553-it-may-not-look-it-barack-obamaspresidency-tied-syria-style-and-substance.
183. Lele & Singh, supra note 1.
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tered support from only half of the G-20 members. 184 UN Members disagreed about threatening Syria with use force, and many countries
adopted a wait-and-see approach. 185 The international community appeared to be in a stalemate. 186 Would Syria’s CW use go unpunished
and therefore make a mockery of the international community, the 1925
Geneva Protocol, the aims of the CWC, and customary international
law?
Making matters more serious, experts believed Syria’s chemical
weapons program to be extensive. 187 Intelligence suggested that Syria
had at least a dozen geographically dispersed sites associated with the
storage, production, and preparation of some 1,000 tons of chemicals as
well as missile warheads, aerial bombs, and artillery rockets that could
be used to deliver those agents. 188
Meanwhile, while the international community awaited the findings of the investigatory mission of alleged CW use in Syria, the U.S.
began discussing alternatives to military force with Russia. 189 The U.S.Russia negotiations cleared an initial hurdle by agreeing on the scale of
Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile, and it cleared a second hurdle
when the U.S. was willing to delay immediate military action. 190 The
U.S., however, continued to assert that an ultimate threat of force, perhaps through a Chapter 7 UN resolution, was vital to any successful disarmament of Syria. 191 President Obama maintained that any agreement
with Russia and Syria must be “verifiable and enforceable.” 192
Perhaps seeking a safe haven in anticipation of the official UN
findings of CW use in Syria, the Syrian Government decided to accede
to the CWC on September 14, 2013, which entered into force on Octo-

184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.; Anthony Deutsch and Khaled Yaoub Oweis, Syria’s Chemical Weapons Programme
was
built
to
counter
Israel,
REUTERS,
(June
4,
2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/04/syria-crisis-chemical-idUSL6N0E20AS20130604.
See also Jonathan Masters, The Chemical Weapons Test in Syria, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, (June 15, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/chemical-weaponstest-syria/p30935.
189. Jay Solomon & Carol Lee, U.S. Backs off Syria Strike for More Talk, WALL ST. J.
(Sept.1415,
2013),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324576304579072951108768752.html.
See
Masters, supra note 188.
190. Solomon & Lee, supra note 189 at 1.
191. Id. at 2.
192. Id. at 1.
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ber 14, 2013, when it also accepted the findings of the UN Mission. 193
Also on September 14, 2013, the U.S. and Russia agreed on a framework for the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons. 194
a. The United States-Russia Framework
The US-Russia Framework for the Elimination of Syrian Chemical
Weapons facilitated fulfillment of Syria’s new obligations under the
CWC. 195 The Framework accounted for Syria’s decision to accede to the
CWC and the Syrian authorities’ commitment to provisionally apply the
Convention prior to its entry into force. 196 The Agreement also expressed the U.S. and Russia’s “joint determination” to ensure that Syrian chemical weapons were destroyed in the “soonest and safest manner”
with “stringent verification thereof.” 197 Language in the Agreement referred to its stated provisions as “extraordinary procedures” necessitated
by the prior use of CW as well as the ongoing Syrian Civil War. 198 The
Joint Paper called upon the OPCW to endorse the agreement for the disarmament of Syria’s CW, and it subsequently called for the UN Security Council to reinforce the decision. 199 The U.S. and Russia also called
upon the UN to regularly review the implementation of the agreed upon
plan, and in the event of non-compliance, to consider Chapter 7 use of
force measures. 200
The Agreement supported the application of Article VIII of the
CWC, which provided for the referral of any cases of non-compliance
to the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council. 201 The plan
required Syria to give, within a week of the Agreement, a “comprehensive” list that included the names, types, and quantities of its chemical
weapons agents; types of munitions; and the location and form of stor-

193. Syria to Come Under Chemical Weapons Treaty Next Month, RADIO FREE EUROPE
(Sept. 15, 2013), available at http://www.rferl.org/content/syria-cwc-chemical-treaty-join-russiaus/25106444.html.
194. OPCW, Joint National Paper by the Russian Federation and the United States of America, Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons, Executive Council, Thirty-Third
Meeting,
Doc.
EC-M-33-NAT.
(Sept.
20,
2013),
available
at
https://www.opcw.org/index.php?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=16707 [hereinafter Joint Paper].
195. Lele & Singh, supra note 1; FAQ about Syria, OPCW, https://www.opcw.org/mediacorner/frequently-asked-questions-faq (last visited October 21, 2013).
196. Joint Paper, supra note 194, at 2.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Joint Paper, supra note 194.
201. Id. at 3.
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age, production, and research and development facilities. 202 The Joint
Paper affirmed that the OPCW would be the most effective engine to
facilitate disarmament, and that destruction should take place outside of
Syria. 203
The two states acknowledged that the Agreement laid out “ambitious goals” for the removal and destruction of all categories of CW related materials and equipment with the objective of completing such
removal and destruction in the first half of 2014. 204 The Paper further
stated that in order to achieve accountability for their chemical weapons, Syria needed to provide the OPCW, the UN, and other supporting
personnel with the “immediate and unfettered” right to inspect any and
all sites, and that OPCW and UN personnel should be dispatched “as
rapidly as possible” to support the control, removal, and destruction of
Syria’s CW capabilities. 205 The two states affirmed that they “intend[ed]
to work closely together,” along with the OPCW, the UN, Syrian parties, and other interested member states that had “relevant capabilities to
arrange for the security of the monitoring and destruction mission,”
while also “recognizing [the] primary responsibility of the Syrian Government in this regard.” 206 The Agreement acknowledged that details to
execute the framework still needed to be addressed, albeit on an “expedited basis,” since “time [was] of the essence.” 207
b. OPCW and UN Adoption of the U.S.-Russia Framework
Both the UN Security Council and the OPCW Executive Council
endorsed the joint U.S.-Russia Framework on September 27, 2013
through Security Council Resolution 2118. 208 Resolution 2118 largely
mirrored the agreement struck by the U.S. and Russia, calling for “full
implementation of the 27 September decision of the Organisation for

202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Joint Paper, supra note 194.
207. Id.
208. See OPCW, Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons, EC-M-33/DEC.1, (Sept. 27,
2013), available at http://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/EC/M-33/ecm33dec01e.pdf [hereinafter Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons]; The UN and Syria: It’s a Deal, ECONOMIST
(Sept.
28,
2013,
12:50
PM),
available
at
http://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2013/09/un-and-syria; Press Release, Security
Council, Security Council Requires Scheduled Destruction of Syria’s Chemical Weapons, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2118, U.N. DEPT. OF PUBLIC INFORMATION (Sept. 27, 2013), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc11135.doc.htm [hereinafter Security Council
Press Release].
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the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which contain[ed] special procedures for the expeditious and verifiable destruction of Syria’s
chemical weapons,” and also for inspections to begin by October 1, just
four days after which the Resolution was agreed upon. 209
The Council specifically “prohibited Syria from using, developing,
producing, otherwise acquiring, stockpiling, or retaining chemical
weapons, or transferring them to other States or non-State actors,” and
emphasized that “no party in Syria should use, develop, produce, acquire, stockpile, retain, or transfer such weapons.” 210 The text also demanded that Syria comply with the OPCW’s decision, “notably by accepting personnel designated by OPCW or United Nations personnel
and providing them with immediate and unfettered access to—and the
right to inspect—any and all chemical weapons sites.” 211 The Security
Council also decided to “regularly review Syria’s implementation of the
OPCW Executive Council decision and the present resolution, requesting the OPCW Director-General, through the Secretary-General, to report to it within [thirty] days and every month thereafter.” 212 The text
pointed to Article VIII of the CWC to reaffirm the Security Council’s
“readiness to consider promptly any reports of the OPCW” of cases of
non-compliance of the CWC, 213 as well as to impose Chapter 7
measures in the event that Syria did not comply with the Resolution. 214
Other notable provisions of the OPCW Decision, adopted by the
UN, were: (1) a call to inspect any other site identified by a State Party
as having been involved in Syria’s CW program, unless unreasonable;
(2) authorization to hire short-term, qualified inspectors and technical
experts to implement the decision; (3) to meet within twenty-four hours
if the UN Director-General reported delays on Syria’s part; and (4) to
recognize that the decision was made due to the “extraordinary character” of the situation posed by Syrian CW, and that it did not create precedent for the future. 215
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
The speed with which Resolution 2118 measures were implemented was impressive, especially considering that many believed no

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Security Council Press Release, supra note 208.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 13.
Id. ¶ 21.
Security Council Press Release, supra note 208, ¶¶ 2(d-e), 3(b), 3(d).
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framework could bring about the disarmament of Syria, 216 whose CW
stockpile was one of the largest in the world. 217 Secretary-General Ban
described the operation as “the likes of which, quite simply, have never
been tried before.” 218 The CWC Executive Council called for the activities necessary for the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons program
to start within the week. 219 Syria extended an immediate invitation to receive a technical delegation from the OPCW and to cooperate with the
OPCW in accordance with a provisional application of the CWC prior
to its entry into force on Syria. 220 In anticipation of the Security Council
Resolution, Syria submitted detailed information on September 19,
2013, concerning its chemical weapon stockpile, “including names,
types, and quantities of its chemical weapons agents; types of munitions; and location and form of storage, production, and research and
development facilities.” 221
On October 1, 2013, exactly according to plan, an OPCW-UN advance team arrived in Damascus to oversee the destruction of Syria’s
CW program. 222 The Syrian government provided visas and facilitated
the team’s transportation. 223 The inspection team planned to complete
verification of Syria’s CW production and storage facilities and oversee
the destruction of Syria’s CW production, mixing, and filling equipment
by November 1, 224 and it aggressively aimed to eliminate Syria’s entire
CW stockpile by June 2014. 225
The plan further called for the transportation of the most critical
chemicals (“Category 1” chemicals) out of Syria by December 31,
216. Jean Pascal & Ralf Trapp, Internationalization of Syria’s Chemical Weapons Stockpile?,
TRENCH (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.the-trench.org/internationalisation-of-syrias-chemicalweapon-stockpile/.
217. Patrick J. McDonnell, Syria Meets Chemical Weapons Deadline, LA TIMES (Oct. 27,
2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/oct/27/world/la-fg-wn-syria-deadline-chemical-arsenal20131027; and see The Syria Crisis: Going Another Round, ECONOMIST (Sept. 28, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21586359-russias-plan-provides-breathing-space-itprobably-unworkable-going-another-round.
218. Ban Seeks 100-Member Joint Mission to Oversee Destruction of Syrian Chemical
Weapons,
UN.ORG
(Oct.
8,
2013),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp/html/story.asp?NewsID=46218&Cr=syria&Cr1=#.Uv6ul
PldWSo.
219. Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons, supra note 208.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. News Release from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the
United
Nations,
UNITED
NATIONS
(Oct.
1,
2013),
http://www.un.org/sg/offthecuff/index.asp?nid=3113.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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2013, and for their destruction in descending order of risk that the
chemicals posed. 226 Chemical weapons facilities within Syria would be
destroyed according to the same risk model, with all chemical weapons
facilities also to be destroyed by June 2014. 227
The final phase, the actual destruction of the chemicals themselves, would be the most complex. 228 The weapons were to be first
packaged in “special containers” and transported across Lebanon’s border. They would then travel by road from multiple location sites to Latakia, Syria’s biggest port, where they were subsequently loaded onto
ships provided by Norway and Denmark, and finally onto the Cape Ray,
an American government-owned vessel. The Cape Ray had equipment
capable of breaking down “lethal chemical agents into sludge similar to
industrial toxic waste.” 229 The biggest challenge from this phase was
getting the chemical-filled containers to the port, since civil war hostilities surrounded the main highway to the port. 230
Predictably, the OPCW altered some deadline goals due to the difficulties of disarming Syria in the midst of a civil war as well as encountering other setbacks along the way. 231 The Syrian government, for
example, missed a February 5, 2014 deadline to remove all of its most
dangerous Category 1 chemicals (which included sulphur mustard and
precursors for sarin nerve gas) from the country, and managed to remove only 11% by the deadline date. 232 While all CW producing

226. OPCW Adopts Plan for Destruction of Syria’s Chemical Weapons Programme in the
First Half of 2014 (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.opcw.org/news/article/opcw-adopts-plan-fordestruction-of-syrias-chemical-weapons-programme-in-the-first-half-of-2014/.
227. Id; Syria’s Chemical Weapons: Can it be Done? ECONOMIST (Oct. 5, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21587239-destroying-chemical-arsenalmidst-civil-war-unprecedented-can-it.
228. McDonnell, supra note 217.
229. Syria’s Civil War: An Inconvenient Truth, ECONOMIST (Dec. 14, 2013), available at
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21591632-destroying-chemicalweapons-depends-governments-military-success.
230. Id.
231. Sam Dagher, Battle Rages Around Syria Chemical Weapons Sites, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11,
2013),
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303382004579127881524159704; Russia
in
the
World: Preening, ECONOMIST
(Sept. 28, 2013), available at
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21586888-vladimir-putin-tries-his-hardest-look-worldstatesman-preening; Roba Alhenawi & Jason Hanna, Safety Concerns Keep Inspectors from 2
Syrian
Weapons
Sites,
CNN
(Oct.28,
2013),
available
at
http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/28/world/meast/syria-civil-war/.
232. Salma Abdelaziz & Jim Sciutto, OPCW: Only 11% of Chemical Weapons Removed
From Syria (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/12/world/meast/syria-civil-war/; Paul
Richter, Syria Unlikely to Meet Deadline On its Deadline Chemical Agents, LA TIMES (Jan. 29,
2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/jan/29/world/la-fg-syria-chemical-20140130.
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equipment had been destroyed, Syria argued for destruction of CW production and storage sites through inactivation, which essentially means
“just locking some doors.” 233 The OPCW, however, maintained that
while the CWC does not define “destruction” of CW production and
storage sites, the “OPCW ‘common law’ offers a definition that has
come to mean ‘taken down to the foundations.’” 234
Other concerns included the possibility that Syria would maintain
hidden stocks of CW and would remain hesitant to give a full history of
its chemical weapons program as required by the CWC. 235 Most alarmingly, new reports of CW use arose in April 2014, alleging that the Syrian regime had “dropped bombs filled with . . . chlorine gas in the rebelheld village of Kfar Zita, injuring and terrifying [at least] dozens of civilians,” and potentially killing two children. 236 Because of its widespread industrial use, chlorine gas is not banned by the CWC; however,
using chlorine to maim or kill would be a clear breach of the CWC. 237
While the identifying, gathering, and transporting of toxic material
from twenty-three different sites through a war-torn country onto awaiting ships “has gone in fits and starts,” 238 important deadlines were met,
and “much [was] achieved.” 239 Syria met its October 27, 2013 deadline
to submit a detailed and comprehensive declaration of its CW facilities
along with a proposal to destroy its chemical arsenal. 240 The OPCW verified that Syria had dismantled twenty-two of the twenty-three declared
CW production sites, and that it had destroyed all of its declared CW
production equipment by the November 1st deadline initially set by the
U.S.-Russia Framework. 241 The OPCW directed the verification of two
sites remotely by live video, since they were unreachable due to war on
the ground. 242 The Syrian Government’s cooperation has been, according to Sigrid Kaag, the Dutch diplomat leading the OPCW Mission in
Syria, “all that could have been hoped for.” 243
233. Eliminating Syria’s Chemical Weapons: Getting There, ECONOMIST (April 26, 2014),
available at http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21601260-deadlines-arebeing-met-regime-still-cannot-be-trusted-getting-there.
234. Id. at 1.
235. Id. at 3.
236. Id.
237. Eliminating Syria’s Chemical Weapons: Getting There, supra note 233.
238. Id.
239. Syria’s Civil War: An Inconvenient Truth, supra note 229.
240. McDonnell, supra note 217.
241. Naftali Bendavid, Inspectors Check Hard-to Reach Syrian Site Remotely, WALL ST. J.
(Nov.
7,
2013),
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303763804579183750157467052.
242. Id.
243. Syria’s War: An Inconvenient Truth, supra note 229.
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At last, achieving a “diplomatic and logistical milestone,” all of
Syria’s CW, including the most dangerous chemicals, were removed
from its borders on June of 2014. 244 “Never before ha[d] a country’s entire chemical arsenal been removed from its borders,” 245 noted Wall
Street Journal writer, Naftali Bendavid. All 1,290 metric tons of chemicals were scheduled to be destroyed at various locations in the U.K.,
Finland, and the U.S., with some of the most dangerous chemicals to be
destroyed aboard the Cape Ray, albeit four months after the original
June 30th deadline. 246
International investment and cooperation from States Parties to the
CWC has played a key role in the safe removal and destruction of
chemicals. Tens of millions of dollars in donations were made to
OPCW funds, and the States Parties also provided ships, vehicles, and
personnel. 247 Specifically, China, Denmark, Norway, Britain, Russia,
and the U.S. provided technical and naval assistance to the Mission. 248
In a rare joint military mission, NATO and Russia made an arrangement
to protect the American ship upon which CW destruction took place
while it was out at sea. 249
V. ABLE MECHANISM: LESSONS FROM SYRIA ABOUT THE CHEMICAL
WEAPONS CONVENTION
While the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons is still underway and potential obstacles remain, the global intervention through the
CWC framework demonstrates that the CWC is in fact a worthy mechanism, realistically capable of ridding the world of chemical weapons.
Even if efforts to destroy Syrian CW are further delayed, or if new CW
is found in Syria, the above conclusion remains the same. Not only has
the internal framework of the CWC enabled the disarmament of Syria in
244. Naftali Bendavid, supra note 241.
245. Id.
246. Id.; Transloading of Syrian Chemicals onto the Cape Ray Completed Without Incident at
Port of Gioia Tauro, ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS (July 2,
2014),
http://www.opcw.org/news/article/transloading-of-syrian-chemicals-onto-the-cape-raycompleted-without-incident-at-port-of-gioia-tauro/ [hereinafter Cape Ray].
247. Gabriels Baczynska & Adrian Croft, REUTERS, Exclusive: Russia, NATO Plan Joint Operation
ON
Syria’s
Chemical
Weapons,
REUTERS
(Feb.
14,
2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/14/us-syria-crisis-russia-natoidUSBREA1D0Y120140214.
248. More Chemical Arms Material Leaves Syria, Joint OPCW-UN Mission Confirms,
UNITED
NATIONS
(Feb.
10,
2014),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp/html/realfile/story.asp?NewsID=47109&Cr=syria&Cr1=#
.Uv_20fldWSo.
249. Baczynska & Croft, supra note 247.
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an extremely challenging and hostile environment, but its ability to do
so raises its status in such a way that drafters of future disarmament
treaties should look to the CWC as a model. 250
1. Internal Capability
The intervention from the international community in Syria
demonstrated that the internal framework of the CWC itself, including
its provisions and those entities responsible for implementing them, is a
capable disarmament mechanism that will be further strengthened by its
success in Syria. 251
First, in accordance with CWC provisions, the amount of international cooperation and support has been monumental. Contrary to
doubts about whether the States Parties would maintain the political will
to enforce the CWC, a myriad of states have contributed to efforts in
Syria through providing financial contributions, CW detection and destruction equipment, technical support, and transportation of the CW itself. 252 The OPCW’s goal of disarming Syria has even brought traditional foes, NATO and Russia, together for a joint mission in order to
help achieve that end. 253
In addition to international cooperation, the Syrian intervention
demonstrated that the CWC framework does indeed have the technical
capability to inspect, verify, and destroy a state’s CW in a short amount
of time. 254 The OPCW was on the ground in Syria to plan, inspect, and
verify its CW declarations within a mere four days of Resolution 2118
authorizing them to do so. 255 It is likely that the OPCW and Technical
Secretariat’s ability to mobilize incentivized Syria to accede to the
CWC before the results of the initial UN investigation were released.
Furthermore, the fact that the OPCW actually developed a plan for disarmament, and adaptively carried out that plan in the midst of a civil
war only serves to strengthen its credibility. The OPCW demonstrated
its dexterity by remotely verifying two CW facilities that were physically unreachable due to heavy combat. 256 The OPCW has also forged
ahead in executing an elaborate plan to transport and destroy CW out250. Margaret E. Kosal, Chemical Weapons Destruction and Public Involvement, in THE
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: IMPLEMENTATION, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 118,
118 (Ramesh Thakur & Ere Haru eds., 2006).
251. See Joint Paper, supra note 194.
252. Id.
253. See id.
254. Thakur, supra note 2; Kosal, supra note 250, at 119.
255. Security Council Press Release, supra note 208.
256. Bendavid, supra note 241.
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side of Syria in the midst of its civil war, which has thus far led to the
destruction of a significant portion of Syria’s CW. 257 The OPCW has
accomplished this despite “[n]ever in the history of [the OPCW]” having “been called on to verify a destruction program within such short
timeframes—and in an ongoing conflict.” 258
The intervention in Syria also furthered the goal of the CWC provisions that call for universality, because Syria ultimately acceded to the
CWC when it faced the threat of inspections and was encouraged from
States Parties to accede. 259 Not only did Syria accede to the treaty, but it
also agreed to a provisional accession one month before the CWC formally became binding on Syria. 260 By acceding to the CWC, Syria essentially received a “get out of jail free” card for having used CW since
it avoided punishment by force. 261 While allowing states to use CW
without being punished is not something the CWC framework desires,
ironically, the goal of CWC universality will more easily be achieved if
states not party to the CWC know that if they use CW, they can avoid
punishment by acceding to the CWC. On the other hand, States Party to
the CWC have now seen in Syria how effective the framework can operate to rid a country of CW, thereby deterring future CWC violators
from using or secretly stockpiling CW.
Furthermore, the Syrian intervention demonstrated that the comprehensive prohibitions and verification procedures set forth in the
CWC are more than idealistic words. The prohibitions outlined in the
CWC prohibit the development, production, acquisition, retention,
stockpiling, transfer, or use of chemical weapons. 262 The OPCW implemented these prohibitions in Syria, essentially undertaking the immediate and total disarmament of Syria’s CW and CW facilities. 263 The
agreed upon plan for the disarmament of Syria was honest and deliberate when it stated that the short time period and breadth of scope of the
disarmament was an “ambitious goal.” 264 The fact that the OPCW and
larger CWC framework did not soften the conditions for disarmament,
257. Cape Ray, supra note 246.
258. Statement by the OPCW Director-General on the 2013 Nobel Prize for Peace,
ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, (Oct. 11, 2013),
https://www.opcw.org/news/article/opcw-receives-2013-nobel-prize-for-peace.
259. Daniel Flakes, Getting Down to the Hard Cases: Prospects for CWC Universality,
ARMS CONTROL ASS’N (Mar. 2008); Joint Paper, supra note 194.
260. Joint Paper, supra note 194.
261. Id. at 3; Syria to Come Under Chemical Weapons Treaty Next Month, RADIO FREE
EUROPE, supra note 193.
262. CWC preamble.
263. Joint Paper, supra note 194, at 15.
264. Joint Paper, supra note 194.
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and the fact that Syria has thus far been a willing participant, 265 further
bolsters the credibility of the CWC as a capable mechanism for the
complete eradication of chemical weapons from the globe.
Moreover, the Syrian intervention demonstrated that the provisions
in the CWC do indeed allow flexibility in the means by which disarmament may be achieved. Rather than rigidly adhering to a traditional
protocol, the provisions in the CWC encouraging regional agreements
to bring States into the CWC framework allowed room for the U.S. and
Russia to agree upon a joint plan for Syrian disarmament. 266 Without the
CWC provisions allowing flexibility, the U.S. would likely have been at
odds with Russia and many other States Parties as to the proper response to Syria’s CW use, and would likely have had to follow its own
path, creating dissension and damaging the CWC framework in the process. Because the CWC provisions encourage side agreements to
achieve its object and purpose, the U.S. and Russia were able to agree to
a plan which both felt would achieve disarmament, and to which Syria
could trust and adhere.
Lastly, in response to Masahiko Asada’s concern that the CWC
would not be fully credible until States Parties had utilized the challenge
procedure mechanism, 267 the intervention in Syria essentially demonstrates that the challenge inspection and verification system provided for
in the CWC is indeed practicable and effective. While the initial investigation of CW use in Syria was under the authority of the SecretaryGeneral’s Mechanism since Syria was not yet party to the CWC, one
can equate the investigation under the SGM with the challenge inspection mechanism under the CWC for several reasons. First, the international community in a sense “challenged” that Syria had used chemical
weapons in the Ghouta region. Only after this challenge did Syria allow
inspectors into the region to investigate. Second, before the UN Mission
team made the investigation results public, Syria acceded to the CWC
and agreed to be provisionally bound by it one month before the CWC
officially became binding upon it. 268 The Syrian government then proceeded to open its borders to the OPCW team, declare all CW and CW
facilities, and allow the process of their immediate verification and destruction. 269 Thus, the Syrian intervention showed that the internal CWC
framework is indeed fit for the task of universal disarmament in a con265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
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stantly evolving world.
2. External Effect of the CWC Framework as Applied in Syria
Because the CWC framework enabled the peaceful disarmament in
Syria, drafters of existing and future disarmament treaties should look to
the CWC as a credible model to mirror. As discussed in part above, the
CWC is “evolutionary compared with earlier treaties and international
agreements.” 270 Unlike the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the
CWC is universal and “does not create a world of chemical apartheid in
which a small group of countries holds legitimate possession of weapons that are banned for everyone else.” 271 Furthermore, unlike the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the CWC contains “rigorous,”
ambitious, and “state-of-the-art provisions on monitoring and verification.” 272 The BWC has been unsuccessful in preventing the proliferation
of biological weapons in part because of “weaknesses in its verification
system.” 273
Efforts to strengthen both the NPT and BWC verification protocols
were either ineffective or not adopted. 274 While nuclear and biological
weapons can cause more large scale harm than chemical weapons, thus
making it harder for a state to surrender them, both the NPT and BWC
should look to the CWC for inspiration that international agreement upon universal destruction is at least possible. Once states arrive at that
premise, they could then look to the verification and challenge mechanisms codified in the CWC, as well as to the real-world example in Syria, to see that those provisions can be used in appropriate, non-abusive,
and effective ways. The demonstration of the effectiveness of the CWC
framework in Syria could perhaps motivate drafters of the NPT, BWC,
and future disarmament treaties to think in a way that allows for more
aggressive disarmament provisions.
3. Unintended Consequences
The successful implementation of the CWC thus far in Syria is not
without drawbacks. Ironically, successful verification and disarmament

270. Margaret E. Kosal, Chemical Weapons Destruction and Public Involvement, in THE
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: IMPLEMENTATION, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES 118,
118 (Ramesh Thakur & Ere Haru eds., 2006).
271. Thakur, supra note 2, at 1.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 5.
274. Asada, supra note 107, at 93-94. See also Leonard S. Spector, Slowing Proliferation:
Why Legal Tools Matter, 34 VT. L. REV. 619, 624-26 (2010).
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in Syria could be its own Achilles’ Heel. Assuming that Syria allowed
a full inspection of its CW stockpile, states not party, such as Israel and
Egypt, could be pressured to do the same if they became party to the
CWC. 275 Israel has not ratified the treaty due to national security concerns. 276 Egypt is believed to be equipped with mustard gas and some
nerve agents. 277 Both states could be put under the microscope to disarm
should they become party to the CWC, which could act as a deterrent to
their joining the CWC. 278
Furthermore, the effective intervention in Syria could subject the
U.S. to a potential retaliatory challenge inspection 279 to ensure that it is
complying with its own destruction plan set to be complete by September 2023. 280 If States Parties became hesitant to issue challenge inspections for fear of a retaliatory challenge, the CWC’s credibility would
suffer, since states would be free to flagrantly violate the CWC without
fear of being challenged. 281 On the other hand, perhaps the Syrian intervention can serve as a reminder that States Parties should speed up the
work of getting rid of chemical weapons—especially if they are demanding that of others. 282
CONCLUSION
Just before 2:30 a.m. on August 21, 2013, poison-filled rockets
“streaked through the clear night sky” of the Damascus suburbs. 283 Sarin
gas, which instantly kills by attacking the nervous system, spread across
sleeping farms and penetrated homes. 284 “Men, women, and children
began coughing and gagging, with little more than wet handkerchiefs
and T-shirts to hold over their mouths.” 285 Local doctors quickly ran out
of antitoxins, and “in a desperate effort to wash away the poison, flood275. Jay Solomon, Disarming Syria Puts Focus on Israel, Egypt Arsenals, WALL ST. J. (Sept.
14-15,
2013),
available
at
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279. Asada, supra note 107, at 90.
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(Oct.
11,
2013),
available
at
https://www.opcw.org/index.php?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=16816.
281. Asada, supra note 107, at 89.
282. Id.
283. Adam Entous, Nour Malas, & Rima Abushakra, As Syrian chemical Attack Loomed,
Missteps Doomed Civilians, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 22, 2013), available at
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ed clinic floors and dragged unconscious victims through the water.” 286
Over 1,400 deaths resulted from the attack, “making it the worst chemical-weapons strike in a quarter century.” 287 The chemical attack in
Ghouta, Syria, and the possibility of such an attack anywhere in the
world, is why effective implementation and ultimate universality of the
CWC is so important.
As of October 2013, the OPCW had overseen the elimination of
82% of the world’s declared stockpile of chemical weapons (58,172
tons) and supervised the destruction of nearly 4.97 million munitions
and containers. 288 The OPCW has even won the Nobel Peace Prize for
its mandate to oversee the destruction of Syria’s chemical arsenal in the
midst of a civil war. 289 The CWC framework deserves such praise for
enabling the stringent verification and destruction of Syrian CW thus
far.
If one can step back to take a bird’s-eye view of the Syrian situation before any proactive international response, several courses of action were possible: (1) a unilateral U.S. military strike, (2) a non-UN
joint military strike, (3) a non-military UN action such as sanctions, and
(4) leaving the matter to be resolved internally in Syria. Only the CWC
framework, through which the U.S. and Russia were able to negotiate,
and to which Syria voluntarily acceded, enabled a deal for the peaceful
removal and destruction of chemical weapons from Syria.
The Syrian intervention demonstrated not only that the CWC provisions and mechanism allowed for the flexibility, adaptability, and
technical capability for, and that the States Parties had the shear political will to bring about total disarmament in Syria, it also proved that the
CWC is capable to bring about chemical disarmament across the world.
Furthermore, the Syrian intervention brings a level of credibility to the
CWC to which drafters of current and future disarmament treaties
should look to for guidance. Rather than a “dinosaur of international relations” from the Cold War, the CWC is a “model for multilateral undertakings to build global consensus in the field of international security
through disarmament.” 290 The Syrian intervention gives the CWC a “rising breeze buffeting its sails” 291 in the eyes of the international commu286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Naftali Bendavid, Kjetil Malkenes Hovland, & Rima Abushakra, Chemical-Weapons
Watchdog Wins Nobel for Peace, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 12-13, 2013), available at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304520704579128800087868102.
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nity. Let us hope that the breeze grows stronger, and that all states jump
onboard the ship.

IMPLEMENTATION, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES 177, 183 (Ramesh Thakur & Ere Haru
eds., 2006).

